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companies. The results from this study indicate that the revaluation of non-current assets is 
positively associated with discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent with the argument 
that revaluation of assets reflects higher agency problems in the form of increased earnings 
management.  Additional findings are that discretionary accruals are higher for firms reporting 
their non-current assets at fair values appraised by directors, than those of firms that use 
external appraisers. As well, the choice of auditors and the strength of corporate governance 
can constrain the opportunistic behaviour of managers in the accounting choice to revalue non-
current assets.  
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1. Introduction 
Motivations for asset revaluations and their economic consequences have been 
extensively explored (Standish and Ung, 1982; Easton et al., 1993; Brown et al., 1992). Prior 
studies indicate that revaluations can be triggered by management incentives with respect to 
contracting, financial needs and political costs (e.g., Brown et al., 1992; Whittred and Chan, 
1992). However, there is limited evidence on whether or not the accounting choice to revalue 
non-current assets is associated with managerial opportunistic behaviour with respect to 
earnings management. 
Two competing views are given about asset revaluations and earnings management. 
Some argue that asset revaluations are mainly motivated by incentives to improve the costly 
contracting process between a company and its claimholders. Specifically, Brown et al. (1992), 
Whittred and Chan (1992), Cotter and Zimmer (1995), and Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) 
use Australian data and find that highly leveraged companies in danger of violating covenants 
are more likely to revalue non-current assets. In a survey of chief financial officers conducted 
by Easton et al. (1993), 40 percent of respondents explicitly indicated that revaluations are 
aimed at decreasing a company’s leverage and loosening debt constraints. Hence, a common 
incentive for asset revaluations is an improvement of a firm’s financial status for contracting 
purposes.  
On the other hand, asset revaluations may reflect lower agency problems provided that 
managers’ primary motivation for revaluation of non-current assets is to signal the fair value of 
assets to financial statements users and to reduce information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders. For example, several studies examine the information content of asset 
revaluations and document a positive stock market reaction for asset revaluations (Sharpe and 
Walker, 1975; Standish and Ung, 1982; Easton et al., 1993; Aboody et al., 1999; Danbolt and 
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Rees, 2008). Following this line of literature, revaluation of assets reflects efficiency 
motivations of the manager or lower agency problems. 
This study aims to extend previous research by providing evidence on the association 
between asset revaluations and managerial opportunistic behaviour with regard to earnings 
management. Earnings management is measured by using discretionary accruals. Using a 
sample of the largest 300 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) firms during 
the years 2003 to 2007, the findings of this study are that revaluation of non-current assets is 
positively associated with discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified Jones 
model (1991). This finding is consistent with the argument that revaluation of assets reflects 
higher agency problems in the form of decreased earnings quality1. The explanation for our 
result is that ex-post an asset revaluation there is the prospect of managers engaging in 
opportunistic behaviour. For example, Black et al. (1998) find that firms will opportunistically 
sell their non-current assets to realise the unrealised component of earnings from asset 
revaluations to increase reported profits2. Additional findings are that discretionary accruals are 
higher for firms reporting their non-current assets at fair values appraised by directors, than 
those of firms that use external appraisers. Last, we provide consistent and strong evidence that 
the choice of auditors and the strength of corporate governance can constrain the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers in the use of asset revaluations.  
The findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, this paper extends 
academic research on managers’ motivations to revalue non-current assets. Most of the earlier 
studies regarding asset revaluations adopted either an information content perspective or a 
                                                            
1 Our study does not test if asset revaluations are directly associated with current period’s earnings. However, a 
high amount of discretionary accruals provides an indication of lower quality of earnings, which is a ‘red flag’ 
that management may be using aggressive accounting to overstate earnings. 
2 The rules for asset revaluations are not the same as for most financial instruments where the unrealised gain or 
loss each period has to go to the P&L, not to reserves as with most asset revaluations.  
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contracting perspective (Sharpe and Walker, 1975; Standish and Ung, 1982; Easton et al., 
1993; Aboody et al., 1999; Danbolt and Rees, 2008). These studies have not considered the 
perspective of the opportunistic behaviour of management. Black et al. (1998) argue that when 
the profit that occurs from a fixed asset sale is estimated on an historical cost basis, 
revaluations may be used to improve the financial appearance of the firm. Whilst separating 
the self-interest versus contracting incentives is complicated, this study attempts to provide 
evidence on the association between asset revaluations and manager’s opportunistic behaviour 
using earnings management. Second, evidence from prior research suggests that the disclosed 
and recognised fair values are informative to investors3. The results from our study show that 
companies that used director-valuations had higher discretionary accruals than those that 
employed external valuers. In other words, the internal director-valuations led to lower 
earnings quality. Our results suggest that the opportunistic behaviour of directors can increase 
bias in the amount of the revaluation increments, leading to a reduced reliability and 
informativeness of the revaluation (Cotter and Richardson, 2002).   
This finding on internal director-valuations is particularly relevant for accounting 
standard setters as firms have the choice to undertake revaluations of non-current assets by 
either internal directors or by independent valuers under Australian Accounting Standard 
(AASB) 116 Property, Plant and Equipment. Third, results from this study complement 
several audit fee studies. For example, a few audit fee studies show that the use of fair value 
accounting is positively associated with audit fees 4  (Yao et al., 2015; Goncharov et al., 
                                                            
3 See Landsman (2007) for a detailed review of value relevance studies. 
4 For example, Yao et al. (2015) find that there is a significant increase in the audit fees paid when non-financial 
assets (PPEs, investment properties and intangible assets) are measured using the ‘revaluation model’. However, 
this study does not investigate whether the use of the fair value model is associated with earnings management 
proxies. 
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2013 and Ettredge et al., 2013).  However, those studies do not directly test if increased audit 
fees are to compensate for the additional litigation risks of or from the additional audit work 
involved in estimating fair values. Results from this study can help to indirectly explain 
findings from these audit fee studies. That is, auditors charge a fee premium to compensate for 
future litigation risk from managerial opportunistic behaviour. Last, this study contributes to 
the debate on fair value accounting in the global market. Currently, a heated debate has 
emerged around the proposition that fair value accounting exacerbated the severity of the 2008 
financial crisis (Laux and Leuz, 2010). The results of this study will provide empirical 
evidence relevant for standard setters and others in their deliberations about the impact of the 
adoption of fair value accounting. 
     The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background and section 3 develops the hypotheses from the relevant literature. Section 4 
presents the sample and research design. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 summarises 
the results from robustness and sensitivity tests. Section 7 provides the concluding comments. 
 
2. Institutional background 
  In Australia, the manager of a firm has discretion whether or not to revalue non-current 
assets. Asset revaluation refers to the act of recognising a reassessment of the carrying amount 
of a non-current asset to its fair value as at a particular date. Prior to 2005, the accounting 
standard for revaluation of assets was AASB 1041 Revaluation of Non-Current Assets. Now 
there are three standards - AASB 116 Property, Plant and Equipment, AASB 138 Intangible 
Assets, and AASB 140 Investment Properties. Specifically, paragraph 29 of AASB 116 states:5 
                                                            
5 Since 1 January 2005, AASB 116 has replaced AASB 1401 in providing guidance on the revaluation for non-
current assets. Both standards are consistent except for some aspects. Compared to AASB 1401, AASB 116 
reduces discretion for revaluation, for example, the discontinuation of revaluation is prohibited. AASB 116 
paragraph 36 does not allow progressive revaluations, instead requiring all assets in a class to be revalued when a 
single asset in that class is revalued. 
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An entity shall choose either the cost model in paragraph 30 or the revaluation model 
in paragraph 31 as its accounting policy and shall apply that policy to an entire class of 
property, plant and equipment. 
     According to AASB 116, revaluations of non-current assets can be made on the basis 
of valuations made by directors or by independent valuers. Based on the accounting rules for 
asset revaluations listed above, managers are not indifferent to how and when they revalue 
their firms’ assets.  
While the contracting explanation discussed above is plausible, the guidelines for 
accounting for asset revaluations in Australia provide managers with incentives to revalue 
company’s assets to reduce debt covenant constraints or to increase reported profit (e.g. firms 
may choose to recognise the unrealised component of profits to beat earnings benchmarks or to 
meet analysts forecast). For example, there is no specific requirement as to the method of 
revaluation to be used, although AASB 116 requires disclosure of the year of valuation and 
whether the valuation was carried out by management or an independent valuer; the 
revaluation reserve included in equity in respect of an item of property, plant and equipment 
may be transferred directly to retained earnings when the asset is retired or disposed of; 
directors may approve cash distributions to shareholders from revaluation reserves but they 
must exercise extreme caution (AASB 116). The discretion provided under Australian 
accounting standards to choose to revalue non-current assets, a choice not available to 
managers of US firms, gives us an opportunity to examine managers’ discretionary behaviour 
in this context. 
 
3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
     Australian firms are permitted to choose between two valuation methods for non-
current assets, the cost method (‘cost model’) or fair value (‘revaluation model’). Prior studies 
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demonstrate that firms will revalue their assets for efficient contracting reasons (Brown et al., 
1992; Easton et al., 1993; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013). Specifically, the choice to revalue 
non-current assets is chosen to signal the liquidation values of assets to creditors, to reduce 
information asymmetry and to mitigate agency costs.  
However, from an agency theory point of view, asset revaluations can also increase 
agency costs especially with director-valuations as internal directors are less independent than 
external independent appraisers, providing managers with opportunities to engage in earnings 
management (Du et al., 2014). Prior research has provided empirical evidence that the 
discretion available under fair value accounting has provided managers with opportunities to 
engage in earnings management (Bratten et al., 2013; Fiechter and Meryer, 2009; and others6). 
In addition, the results from some audit fee studies show that the use of fair value accounting is 
positively associated with audit fees (Yao et al., 2015; Goncharov et al., 2013 and Ettredge et 
al., 2013).  The results of these studies indirectly suggest that higher audit fees are to 
compensate auditors for the increased litigation risks incurred by the auditor in estimating fair 
values.  
The use of the ‘revaluation model’ allows reporting entities to measure their non-
current assets at fair value after initial recognition. The most challenging issue with non-
financial assets is that relatively few of these assets (e.g. PPE and investment property) are 
traded in active markets. That is, the fair value of non-financial assets is usually estimated 
based on unobservable managerial inputs and assumptions (Level 3 inputs 7 ), providing 
managers with incentives to revalue non-current assets for their private benefits, such as 
                                                            
6 See Henry, 2009; Barth et al. 1994; Hodder et al. 2006; Li and Sloan, 2009; Song, 2008; Fargher and Zhang, 
2012; Ramanna and Watts, 2009; Dechow et al. 2010; Shalev et al. 2013; Livne et al. 2011.  
7 AASB 13 Fair Value Measurement establishes a fair value hierarchy that categorises into three levels the inputs 
to valuation techniques used to measure fair value. The fair value hierarchy gives the lowest priority to 
unobservable inputs (Level 3 inputs).  
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performance-based bonuses and promotion. In terms of these two competing views, we 
develop an alternative hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 1 (a): Asset revaluations are positively associated with discretionary accruals (a 
proxy for earnings management); 
Hypothesis 1 (b): Asset revaluations are negatively associated with discretionary accrual (a 
proxy for earnings management). 
 
 AASB 116, AASB 138 and AASB 140 require reporting entities to disclose the 
appraisers who value the non-financial assets that are measured using the ‘revaluation model’. 
There is no specific requirement on whether the companies should use internal director- 
valuations or employ external independent appraisers, although AASB 140 recommends an 
independent valuer for investment properties. One of the criticisms of director-based 
valuations is that they can suffer from intentional biases. For example, Benston (2008, p. 106) 
claims that ‘dishonest and opportunistic CFOs and CEOs are likely to find fair value 
accounting a boon to their efforts to manipulate reported net income.’ Generally, external 
valuers have more credibility in estimating asset values because they are independent (Cotter 
and Richardson, 2002). Therefore, we expect that independent appraisers will constrain 
opportunistic revaluations because of potential litigation risks. 
Hypothesis 2: Discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management) are higher for firms 
reporting their non-current assets at fair values appraised by directors than those of firms that 
use external appraisers. 
 Strong corporate governance leads to a more effective control environment of the 
organisation. The literature has identified the important roles of auditors and the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. Generally, financial reports audited by Big 4 auditors are 
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perceived to be of high quality.  For example, Francis and Wang (2008) argue that, in order to 
protect their brand name reputation from legal exposure and reputation risk, Big 4 auditors are 
in place to constrain aggressive earnings management behaviours from their clients, resulting 
in more credible earnings announcements. In addition, internal corporate governance 
mechanisms are established to monitor managers’ behaviour and also to ensure the reliability 
of financial reporting. Extensive research has been conducted relating to the association 
between earnings management and certain corporate governance practices (Ronen et al., 2006, 
Tzur and Yaari, 2006; Kao and Chen, 2009; Benkel et al., 2006; Hutchinson et al., 2008; 
Sebahattin and Harlan, 2009; Raghavan, 2010; Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005). 
This stream of research has found that the probability of earnings management is lower in 
companies with stronger internal corporate governance mechanisms. According to agency 
theory, asset revaluations can provide managers with opportunities to engage in earnings 
management especially when the fair value of non-current assets has to be estimated using 
managerial assumptions and models. Consistent with the literature, we predict that the Big 4 
auditors and strong corporate governance mechanisms can effectively constrain managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour when estimating the fair value of non-current assets.  
Hypothesis 3 (a): Big 4 auditors have a negative effect on the association between asset 
revaluations and discretionary accruals (a proxy for earnings management). 
Hypothesis 3 (b): The strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms has a negative 
effect on the association between asset revaluations and discretionary accruals (a proxy for 
earnings management). 
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4. Sample and research model 
4.1 Research model 
     The first hypothesis will be investigated using a model, which predicts the association 
between the choice of revaluation and earnings management (proxied by the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals). We cannot detect the motives for asset revaluations by this method but 
this approach will allow us to assess to some extent whether firms use discretion to 
opportunistically revalue their assets. This model will be a function of the choice of 
revaluation as well as a number of firm and industry specific characteristics previously found 
to explain the extent to which a firm will revalue assets (e.g., Brown et al., 1992; Christensen 
and Nikolaev, 2013; Easton et al.,1993).  
DAit=α0+α1REVALUATIONit+α2SIZEit+α3LEVERAGEit+α4ROAt+α5BIG4it+α6CGit+α7IASit+ 
Year_Dummy+Industry_Dummy……………………………………………………….……….… (1)   
Discretionary accruals (DA) are calculated using the modified Jones model (1991), that 
is, TA / Assets it-1 = β0 + β1(1/ Assets it-1) + β2(ΔSales – ΔRec / Assets it-1) + β3(PPE / Assets it-1 ) 
+ ε, where TA is total accruals (equal to net income minus operating cash flow),  Assets are 
total assets, Sales are total revenues, Rec is account receivable, PPE is the total of plant, 
property and equipment.  
The discretionary accrual is defined as the residual of the regression above. The 
explanatory variables and control variables include: REVALUATION is defined as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm revalues assets such as PPE, intangible assets or investment 
properties in year t; SIZE is defined as the log of total assets; LEVERAGE is defined as the 
ratio of total debts to total assets; ROA is defined as the return on assets equal to net income 
divided by the average of total assets; BIG4 is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 
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4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise; CG is the self-constructed corporate governance score8; IAS 
is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is after 2005 when International Financial 
Reporting Standards were adopted in Australia.  
To test the second hypothesis, we use observations (n=131) where non-current assets 
are measured at fair values from 2003-2007 to examine the effects of the choice of valuation 
appraisers (DIRECTORit) on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Accordingly, the 
following fixed-effect model is used: 
DAit=α0+α1 DIRECTORit +α2SIZEit+α3LEVERAGEit+α4ROAt+α5BIG4it+α6CGit+α7IASit+ 
Year_Dummy+Industry_Dummy…………………………………………………………….…… (2)   
The variable, DIRECTORit, is included in Equation 2, which is measured as 1 if any of 
the non-current assets are revalued by internal directors and 0 otherwise. If director-valuations 
are less credible in ascertaining the values of non-current assets (e.g. low independence) and 
provide managers with opportunities to engage in earnings management then the coefficient of 
DIRECTORit will be positive.  
The last hypothesis examines whether the choice of auditors and corporate governance 
mechanisms have moderating effects on the magnitude of discretionary accruals in the course 
of assessing fair value estimates. The following fixed-effect model is used to test our 
hypothesis. 
DAit=α0+α1REVALUATIONit+α2SIZEit+α3LEVERAGEit+α4ROAt+α5BIG4it+α6CGit+α7IASit+ 
α8BIG4*REVALUATIONit+α9CG*REVALUATIONit+Year_Dummy+Industry_Dummy…… (3) 
                                                            
8  Six individual control variables measuring corporate governance are analysed to produce a corporate 
governance score in this study, including size of the board of directors, board independence, duality of the role of 
board chair and chief executive officer, presence of an audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination 
committee. These items are based on the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (2010). Only size of the board of directors and board independence are continuous variables. 
The rest of the variables are dichotomous. The corporate governance index will be calculated as the total of 
corporate governance score divided by six. 
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Equation 3 is essentially identical to equation 1 with the exception that the independent 
variable (REVALUATION) interacts with the variables, BIG4 and CG. If high quality auditors 
and stronger corporate governance can mitigate the concerns about managers’ opportunistic 
reporting or errors inherent in the estimation, then we predict the coefficients (α8 and α9) to be 
negative. 
4.2 Data and Sample 
The sample is defined as the ASX 300 listed firms9 for the five year sample period from 
2003-2007 which incorporates the pre-IFRS adoption period (2003-2004) and post-IFRS 
adoption period (2005-2007). We manually collect the data on the revaluation of PPE, 
investment properties and intangible assets by reading the annual reports. All financial 
variables are downloaded from Aspect Fin Analysis.  The sample selection procedures are as 
follows. First, 326 firm-year observations from the financial sector have been excluded as the 
business structure of financial companies is different from that of non-financial companies. 
Second, 138 observations are excluded because of missing values for either one or more 
variables. Third, 30 firm-year observations are deleted where there is a discrepancy between 
the GICS industry codes and their classification in the Morningstar database. Finally, we delete 
the 1st and 99th percentiles of the dependent variable. For testing of hypothesis 1, the final 
sample consists of 951 firm-year observations from 196 unique companies. Table 1 below 
outlines the sample selection procedures. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 The Australian top 300 companies were chosen based on the S&P/ASX 300 index as at 2005. 
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Table 1.This table presents the sample selection for the analysis reported in Tables 6. 
 Firm-years observations 
Original observations (ASX 300 * 5 years) 1500 
Less:  
Financials 326 
Missing financial data 138 
Companies that are not applicable to GISC 30 
Outliers 55 
Final Sample  951 
Hypothesis 1 and 3 sample: ASX 300 companies from 
non-financial industries 
 
951 
Hypotheses 2 sample: ASX 300 companies whose non-
financial assets (PPE; intangible assets or investment 
property) were measured at fair values 
131 
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
     Table 2 presents the description of the asset revaluations by industry. The industry is 
classified based on the two-digit GICS code downloaded from Aspect Fin Analysis. The assets 
that firms revalue include PPE, intangible assets and investment properties. The first column 
shows that 114 firms choose to revalue PPE. These firms are mostly in the Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Materials and Industrials industries. The second column 
shows that 12 firms choose to revalue intangible assets. These firms are mostly in the 
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Consumer Discretionary, Materials and Industrials industries. The third column shows that 31 
firms choose to revalue investment properties. The fourth column shows that there are a total 
of 131 firms that choose to revalue any one of the PPE, intangible assets and investment 
properties. Overall, those firms are mostly in the Consumer Discretionary, Materials and 
Industrials industries. Interestingly, no firms in the energy, telecommunication services and 
utilities industries have revalued their assets.  
Table 2.This table describes asset revaluation across industries based on the two-digit GICS 
code. The assets that firm revalues include PPE, intangible assets and investment properties. 
 
    
Revaluation of assets 
2-digit  
GICS 
Industry N PPE(1) Intangible  
Assets(2) 
Investment  
Property(3) 
All  
Assets(4) 
10 Energy 91 0 0 0 0 
15 Materials 230 33 3 9 38 
20 Industrials 201 18 3 12 27 
25 Consumer Discretionary 163 22 5 10 24 
30 Consumer Staples 82 26 0 5 27 
35 Health Care 80 11 1 0 11 
45 Information Technology 39 4 0 0 4 
50 Telecommunication Services 41 0 0 0 0 
55 Utilities 24 0 0 0 0 
Total  951 114 12 31 131 
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all the test variables. The mean discretionary 
accruals for companies in the samples is 0.006. The descriptive statistics also show that the 
average size of sample companies is 3.06 billion with a standard deviation of 7.97 billion, 
suggesting that the sample covers a wide range of companies. Companies in the sample had 
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total debt of approximately 24% of their assets. In terms of the profitability of these 
companies, on average, the ROA ratio is 7%, which indicates that more than 50% of 
companies in the sample reported an accounting profit. Moreover, 90% of the companies were 
audited by a Big 4 audit firms during the period from 2003-2007. Last, the mean of CG is 77%, 
indicating a strong corporate governance structure of sample companies. 
Table 3.This table provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the multivariate 
regression analysis.  
 
Continuous Variable N Mean Stand. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
DA 951 0.006 0.091 -0.025 0.009 0.036 
Assets ($M) 951 3,060 7,970 256 782 2,420 
Leverage 951 0.236 0.185 0.098 0.228 0.329 
ROA 951 0.068 0.123 0.042 0.070 0.102 
CG 951 0.771 0.181 0.667 0.833 0.833 
 
Dummy Variable N Yes % No % 
Revaluation 951 131 14% 820 86% 
BIG4 951 860 90% 94 10% 
Director 131 87 66% 44 34% 
 
Notes: DA is defined as the discretionary accruals which are estimated based on the modified Jones model (1991); 
Assets are defined as the total assets of a firm; Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets; ROA is 
defined as the return on assets; CG is the self-constructed corporate governance score; Revaluation is defined as a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm revalues assets such as PPE, intangible assets or investment properties in 
year t; BIG4 is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise; Director is 
measured as 1 if any of the non-current assets are revalued by internal directors and 0 otherwise.  
 
In term of accounting choices for non-current assets, 14% of companies in the sample had 
measured their non-current assets at fair values after initial recognition (the ‘revaluation 
model’), which is a small proportion of the sample, as compared to 86% of companies that 
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applied the ‘cost model’ to their non-current assets. Within the companies that have revalued 
their non-current assets, 66% selected internal directors to estimate any one type of asset value.  
Table 4 compares the mean and standard deviation of all variables from the two sub-
samples of companies, those using the ‘cost model’ or those using the ‘revaluation model’.10 
We find that, first, discretionary accruals (t-stat=9.356) of firms that choose the ‘revaluation 
model' are significantly higher than those of firms that choose the ‘cost model’ which 
indirectly supports hypothesis one. Second, the ROA (t-stat=-2.740) and CG (t-stat=-3.745) of 
firms that have used the ‘revaluation model’ is lower as compared to firms that used the ‘cost 
model’. This finding suggests that poorly performing firms and firms with weaker corporate 
governance are more likely to measure their non-current assets at fair values which may enable 
earnings management. 
Pearson correlation coefficients on the variables used in each of the tests are presented in 
Table 5. The measure of discretionary accruals (DA) is positively correlated with the variables, 
Revaluation and Leverage and negatively correlated with Size, ROA, BIG4 and CG as 
hypothesised (two tailed p-value 0.01 or 0.05 level).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10   The sample is divided into two sub-samples based on the valuation model. Sub-sample 1 (N=820) consists of 
companies whose non-financial assets (PPE; intangible assets or investment property) are measured at cost while 
sub-sample 2 (N=131) consists of companies whose non-financial assets are measured at fair value after initial 
recognition. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics (independent t-test). This table presents the mean and median of 
all variables in a sub-sample of firms that chooses the revaluation model and a sub-sample of 
firms that chooses the cost model.  
  Fair-value Model 
 N=131 
Cost Model 
 N=820 
    
 Mean SD Mean  SD Mean 
Difference 
t-stat 
DA 0.072 0.155 -0.004 0.071 0.076 9.356*** 
LogTA 8.841  0.728 8.937 0.744 -0.096  -1.387  
Leverage 0.229 0.148 0.237 0.190 -0.008  -0.471 
ROA 
CG 
BIG4 
0.041 
0.716 
0.895 
0.088 
0.199 
0.308 
0.073 
0.779 
0.903 
0.12 7 
0.176 
0.295 
-0.031 
-0.063 
-0.008 
-2.740*** 
-3.745*** 
-0.307 
Notes: DA is defined as the discretionary accruals which are estimated based on the modified Jones model (1991); 
LogTA is defined as the logarithm of total assets; Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets; 
ROA is defined as the return on assets; CG is the self-constructed corporate governance score; Revaluation is 
defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm revalues assets such as PPE, intangible assets or investment 
properties in year t; BIG4 is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 otherwise; 
The number in the parenthesis below is t-statistics value. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
5.2 Regression results 
Table 6 presents the regression results for hypothesis one, whether asset revaluations are 
associated with discretionary accruals. The dependant variable is discretionary accruals. The 
experimental variable, Revaluationit, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm chooses to 
measure any of its non-current assets (e.g. PPE, intangible assets or investment properties) at 
fair values. The results show that discretionary accruals are increasing when non-current assets 
are measured at fair value (coefficient=0.06, t-stat=7.73) and the result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (p=0.000). Therefore, hypothesis one is supported. The finding from 
hypothesis one is consistent with the argument that fair value measurement of non-financial 
18 
 
assets increases agency costs. For example, the nature of fair value estimates (e.g. less reliable 
and highly subjective) can provide managers with opportunities to engage in earnings 
management. Further, the sign of the coefficients of the control variables: Size, Leverage, ROA, 
BIG4 and CG are consistent with expectations and prior studies (e.g., Brown et al., 1992; 
Christensen and Nikolaev, 2013; Easton et al., 1993).  
 
Table 5. Table 5 shows the correlations between variables. 
 DA Revaluation LogTA Leverage ROA BIG4 CG IAS 
DA 1.000        
Revaluation 0.289*** 1.000       
LogTA -0.215*** -0.045 1.000      
Leverage 0.071** -0.015 0.299*** 1.000     
ROA -0.211*** -0.088*** 0.226*** -0.037 1.000    
BIG4 -0.191*** -0.009 0.253*** 0.138*** 0.048 1.000   
CG -0.197*** -0.120*** 0.405*** 0.076** 0.095*** 0.232*** 1.000  
IAS 0.048 -0.025 0.135*** 0.099*** 0.038 0.040 0.002 1.000 
Notes: DA is defined as the discretionary accruals which are estimated based on the modified Jones model (1991); 
Revaluation is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm revalues assets such as PPE, intangible assets or 
investment properties in year t; LogTA is defined as the logarithm of total assets; Leverage is defined as the ratio 
of total debts to total assets; ROA is defined as the return on assets; CG is the self-constructed corporate 
governance score; Revaluation is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm revalues assets such as PPE, 
intangible assets or investment properties in year t; BIG4 is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 
auditor is used and 0 otherwise; 
The number in the parenthesis below is t-statistics value. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Regression Model: Dependant variable = Discretionary Accruals (DA) 
  H1 H2 H3 
Variable Coefficient (t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 0.25*** 0.73*** 0.15*** 
  (6.45) (4.92) (4.18) 
Revaluation 0.06***   0.47*** 
  (7.73)   (15.49) 
Director   0.05**   
    (2.39)   
CG -0.03* -0.18*** 0.02 
  (-1.78) (-3.52) (1.03) 
CG* Revaluation     -0.25*** 
      (-6.53) 
BIG4 -0.05*** -0.26*** -0.01 
  (-5.20) (-8.41) (-1.17) 
BIG4* Revaluation     -0.25*** 
      (-10.08) 
Size -0.02*** -0.03** -0.02*** 
  (-4.99) (-2.03) (-4.67) 
Leverage 0.07*** 0.14** 0.06*** 
  (4.11) (2.36) (3.94) 
ROA -0.09*** -0.16 -0.09*** 
  (-3.94) (-1.46) (-4.15) 
IAS 0.02 0.03 0.02 
  (0.25) (1.12) (0.25) 
Year_Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Indus_Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fix Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. # 951 131 951 
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.62 0.35 
 
Notes: The dependant variable is discretionary accruals. DA is defined as the discretionary accruals which are 
estimated based on modified Jones model (1991); Revaluation is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm revalues assets such as PPE, intangible assets or investment properties in year t; Director is measured as 1 if 
any of the non-current assets are revalued by internal directors and 0 otherwise; CG is the self-constructed 
corporate governance score; BIG4 is a dummy variable given the value 1 when a Big 4 auditor is used and 0 
otherwise; Size is defined as the logarithm of total assets; Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debts to total 
assets; ROA is defined as the return on assets; IAS is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is after 
2005 when International Accounting Standard were adopted in Australia. BIG4* Revaluation is an interaction 
variable of BIG4 and Revaluation; CG* Revaluation is an interaction variable of CG and Revaluation. 
The number in the parenthesis below is t-statistics value. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 6 also presents the regression results for hypothesis two, the association between 
discretionary accruals and the choice of appraisers. We use observations (n=131) where non-
current assets are measured at fair values from 2003-2007 to examine the effects of the choice 
of valuation appraisers on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. We include Directorit as the 
experimental variable in our regression analysis. The results indicate that companies that 
selected director-valuations had higher discretionary accruals (coefficient=0.05, t-stat=2.39), 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.019). The explanation of this finding is 
that internal directors are less independent than external independent appraisers, providing 
managers with opportunities to engage in earnings management. 
The regression results for hypothesis three, which investigates whether the choice of 
auditors and the strength of corporate governance have a moderating effect on the association 
between asset revaluations and discretionary accruals, are also presented in Table 6. The 
coefficient on Revaluationit alone is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient 
decreased by 0.25 for firms audited by BIG4 auditors (e.g. Revaluation*BIG4 coefficient=-
0.25, t-stat=-10.08) and for firms with comparatively stronger corporate governance (e.g. 
Revaluation*CG coefficient=-0.25, t-stat=-6.53). Altogether, the results from these tests 
indicate that good corporate governance mechanisms play an important monitoring role in 
reducing agency costs induced by fair value estimates.  
 
6. Robustness tests and sensitivity analysis 
We perform a number of additional tests to provide robustness to the main results. First, 
we estimate discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005) model. The results 
(untabulated) are consistent with the results reported in Table 6, both in terms of the sign of the 
coefficients and their statistical significance. Second, we test whether debt levels could 
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confound our results. Prior studies find that leveraged companies in danger of violating 
covenants are more likely to revalue assets (Brown et al., 1992; Whittred and Chan, 1992). 
Hence, the presence of debt covenants can provide a motivation for managers to exercise their 
discretion in choosing to revalue non-current assets. We partition the sample by the constraints 
of a debt covenant, proxied by the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. We continue to reach 
the same conclusions, indicating that results are not driven by differences in the long-term debt 
ratio. Third, we test whether firm size alters the results. Specifically, we divided the sample 
into two sub-samples based on the median of total assets. Results remain unchanged.  
 
7. Concluding comments 
We examine whether asset revaluations are related to earnings management using a 
sample of the largest 300 Australian firms listed on the ASX for the years 2003 to 2007. 
Earnings management is measured using discretionary accruals. The findings indicate that 
asset revaluations are positively associated with earnings management, proxied by 
discretionary accruals. Furthermore, companies that used revaluations undertaken by directors 
have higher discretionary accruals than those that employed external valuers. Last, evidence is 
provided that the choice of Big 4 auditors and the strength of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms have a negative impact on the association between asset revaluations and 
discretionary accruals. Altogether, the results suggest that asset revaluations can significantly 
increase agency costs if managers tend to act opportunistically for their own benefits. Black et 
al. (1998) argue that when the profit that occurs from a fixed asset sale is estimated on an 
historical cost basis, revaluations may be used to improve the financial appearance of the firm. 
Our results suggest that the opportunistic behaviour of directors can increase bias in the 
amount of the revaluation increments, leading to a reduced reliability and informativeness of 
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the revaluation (Cotter and Richardson, 2002).  This study also highlights the important role of 
strong internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs caused 
by asset revaluations. 
The study has some limitations. For example, there is a focus on non-financial 
companies. Thus the results may not be generalisable to firms from the financial industry.  
Also, we do not examine the impact of global financial crisis (GFC) on managers’ incentives 
to revalue assets. Extending our study to firms in the financial sector and to incorporate the 
GFC period are important avenues for future research. 
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